Options for a New
American Strategy toward Iran
June 2009
The Saban Center at The Brookings Institution
“To illustrate how
different events could greatly affect the viability and attractiveness of the
various options, imagine that King Abdullah of Saudi
Arabia dies within the
next one to two years and is succeeded by Prince Nayif ibn Abd al-Aziz, recently
named the second deputy prime minister. Although
Abdullah is deeply concerned about Iran
and its pursuit of a nuclear capability, he has steadfastly pursued a policy of
détente with Tehran
for more than a decade. Nayif, on the other hand, is widely believed to favor a
much tougher policy toward Iran,
and he might come to Washington and tell the
president that Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons is simply intolerable for
Saudi Arabia.
Assume for a minute that Nayif also pledges to support the United States in taking a more aggressive
approach than the new Persuasion policy, and asserts that if the United States
is unable to do so, then the Saudis will acquire nuclear weapons of their own. This
would constitute a fairly dramatic divergence from Abdullah’s policy and would
significantly change many of the pros, cons, and requirements of the different
options. With Saudi Arabia (and the rest of the GCC ) behind the United States,
Washington might consider airstrikes, regime change, and even an invasion as
being both more feasible and less costly than they appear today. Similarly, if
the United States believes
that it is highly likely that Saudi Arabia
will acquire nuclear weapons if Iran
crosses the nuclear threshold, both Persuasion and Engagement may look less
appealing.”
