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“La sabiduría de la vida consiste en la eliminación de lo no esencial. En reducir los problemas de la filosofía a unos pocos solamente: el goce del hogar, de la vida, de la naturaleza, de la cultura”. Lin Yutang

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[This article by Ret. Adm. Cem Gurdeniz was originally published on his Substack. You can read it here.]
The world is witnessing one of the most significant geopolitical transformations of the past five centuries. The ocean-centered world order that emerged with Europe’s expansion into the Atlantic in the 16th century, shaped first by Portugal and Spain, then by the Netherlands and Britain, and ultimately by the United States, is now facing a historic challenge from the rise of China. Throughout this 500-year period, and particularly over the last three centuries, Anglo-Saxon maritime supremacy has been a defining feature of the international order. Today, that supremacy is being challenged by a continental power emerging from outside the Western world, equipped with enormous industrial capacity and an integrated maritime economy.
[Image: The Dutch Raid on the Medway in 1667 during the Second Anglo–Dutch War (Public Domain)]
At the heart of this challenge lie far more than warships, aircraft carriers, or submarines. The real struggle concerns who will control the circulatory system of the world economy, through which ports global maritime trade will flow, which power will shape global production and supply chains, and how influence over strategic maritime chokepoints will be exercised. China has understood that sea power is not merely a matter of naval strength. It is building a vast, mutually reinforcing maritime system encompassing shipyards, merchant fleets, ports, fishing fleets, coast guard forces, research vessels, submarines, aircraft carriers, and global infrastructure investments. The United States, by contrast, still possesses the world’s most formidable network of overseas military bases and extraordinary naval operational capabilities. Yet the economic and industrial foundations of American sea power are undergoing serious erosion.
The fundamental development threatening the future of American maritime supremacy is not simply that China possesses more warships than the US Navy. It is that the maritime industrial ecosystem the United States has progressively lost is expanding in China at an extraordinary pace. What we are witnessing is a historic transformation far greater than a rivalry between two navies. Alongside the traditional struggle for power based on territorial occupation and military basing, a new geopolitical competition is emerging, centered on control over maritime economic flows, ports, strategic chokepoints, and global logistics networks.
Throughout history, the strategic distinction between land power and sea power has played a decisive role in the rise and fall of great empires. Powers that ruled vast continental territories, such as the Ottoman Empire, Habsburg Spain, Napoleonic France, and the Soviet Union, eventually confronted the ever-increasing military, economic, and administrative costs of defending their possessions. Every new conquest required additional garrisons, defensive lines, and logistical commitments. Over time, the costs of expansion began to outweigh its benefits. This is the problem of imperial overstretch that has weakened so many empires throughout history. Maritime powers, by contrast, established influence over global economic flows not primarily by occupying vast territories, but by controlling trade routes, strategic straits, ports, and the critical nodes of maritime transportation. This is precisely where the strategic importance of chokepoints such as Gibraltar, Suez, Bab el-Mandeb, Hormuz, and Malacca originates. Yet sea power cannot be reduced to naval forces alone. Merchant fleets, shipyards, ports, finance, insurance, and maritime technologies constitute its essential economic foundations.
Britain’s transformation from a relatively small island state into a global empire offers a historic illustration of this strategy. Without occupying continental Europe, Britain established maritime supremacy through its control of sea lanes, strategic chokepoints, and hundreds of coaling stations across the world’s oceans. Supported by the Royal Navy, its merchant marine, banking institutions, and insurance industry, Britain rose to a commanding position in the global economy. Through naval blockades, overseas trading networks, and interventions in the continental balance of power, it converted military superiority into economic dominance. Following the Second World War, global maritime supremacy passed from Britain to the United States. The common denominator in the rise of both powers was the formidable industrial, commercial, and maritime economy underpinning their naval strength. Today, China’s ascent demonstrates that this historic relationship between sea power and economic production is once again becoming a decisive factor in shaping the global balance of power.
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concept of sea power was never confined to naval fleets alone. It rested on the combined strength of geographical position, industrial capacity, merchant shipping, ports, maritime culture, and state policy. China’s rise over the past four decades stands as one of the most remarkable examples of how these elements can be developed in pursuit of a common strategic objective. During the Mao era, China primarily prioritized continental defense. However, with the introduction of economic reforms and the opening-up policy, Beijing began integrating industrial production, ports, foreign trade, and shipbuilding capacity into a comprehensive maritime strategy. In the 1980s, Admiral Liu Huaqing laid the strategic foundations for the Chinese Navy’s transformation from coastal defense to control of the near seas and, ultimately, power projection into distant oceans. Engineers such as Huang Xuhua, one of the pioneers of China’s nuclear submarine program, developed the technological foundations of this transformation.
[Image: Rear-admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (Public Domain)]
Today, Type 055-class warships, nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers equipped with electromagnetic catapults, amphibious platforms, and fleet replenishment vessels are the products of this long-term strategy. Yet China’s sea power extends far beyond these military assets. Its global merchant fleet, unrivaled shipbuilding industry, oceanographic research vessels, distant-water fishing fleets, and coast guard forces, operating under different missions and legal frameworks, collectively reinforce China’s growing presence across the world’s oceans. Despite being a continental power, China has placed its expansion into the oceans at the very heart of its national power strategy. China’s rise, therefore, is not merely a process of naval modernization. It represents a comprehensive transformation into a maritime nation, integrating the economic, technological, industrial, and military capabilities of the state.
One of the most important developments I have repeatedly emphasized over the years in my writings on the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) is the extraordinary pace at which China has expanded its sea power, while the economic and industrial foundations of American maritime strength have steadily eroded. Following the Cold War, the United States reduced the size of its Navy, lost much of its global standing in commercial shipbuilding, and became increasingly dependent on foreign-flagged merchant fleets for maritime transportation. China followed precisely the opposite course. It first expanded its industrial production capacity, then developed its ports, shipyards, and merchant fleet, and subsequently began building a modern blue-water navy upon this enormous economic and industrial foundation. Today, China enjoys numerical superiority in naval vessels, while the United States retains the advantage in total fleet tonnage, largely due to its aircraft carriers. The US Navy has 291 battle-force ships, compared with approximately 370 vessels in the Chinese Navy. However, it must be emphasized that numerical superiority in ships does not automatically translate into superiority in overall combat capability.
The United States continues to maintain significant advantages through its 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, greater aggregate warship tonnage, nuclear submarine capabilities, extensive experience in blue-water operations, and global logistics support network. China, meanwhile, possesses three aircraft carriers, while rapidly expanding its fleet of destroyers, frigates, corvettes, amphibious warfare ships, and submarines. One of the most striking indicators of China’s rise as a maritime power is its aircraft carrier program. In 1998, China purchased the unfinished Soviet-built aircraft carrier Varyag from Ukraine, modernized the vessel, and commissioned it into service as Liaoning in 2012. This was followed by Shandong, built in Chinese shipyards and commissioned in 2019, and Fujian, equipped with electromagnetic catapults and commissioned in 2025. Thus, in approximately a quarter of a century, China transformed itself from a country learning how to operate aircraft carriers into a maritime power capable of constructing technologically advanced carriers. This achievement reflects not only progress in warship construction but also the remarkable level China has attained in aviation, electronics, propulsion systems, metallurgy, and marine engineering.
[Image: The aircraft carrier Liaoning in Hong Kong in 2017 (CC BY-SA 2.5)]
The US Navy carries global responsibilities across the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean, and other maritime theaters. China, by contrast, can concentrate a substantial portion of its naval forces in waters close to its own coastline. In potential conflict zones such as the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, China relies not only on its Navy but also on land-based airfields, long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, coastal radar networks, and satellite-supported intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting systems. It can therefore integrate naval, air, missile, space, and electronic warfare capabilities within a single operational theater. The United States, meanwhile, must deploy forces and logistics support from thousands of kilometers away, protect its forward bases, and sustain operations across extended supply lines. China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities significantly challenge the freedom of maneuver of American aircraft carrier strike groups and other surface forces.
Another critical dimension of this competition is submarine warfare. The United States continues to maintain a significant advantage in nuclear-powered attack submarines, particularly in acoustic stealth, sensor technology, weapons systems, crew training, and extensive experience in sustained ocean operations. China, however, is expanding its nuclear submarine production capacity while employing its conventional submarines as an integral component of its defense system in the near seas. The shipyard capacity constraints and maintenance problems confronting the United States in maintaining the number of nuclear-powered attack submarines required for its global commitments are important factors that could influence the long-term balance of naval power. At the same time, China’s growing nuclear submarine fleet has not yet eliminated America’s technological and operational superiority in undersea warfare. The greatest structural asymmetry between the two powers, however, lies in the shipbuilding industry.
China accounts for approximately three-quarters of global commercial shipbuilding activity, while America’s capacity to construct ocean-going commercial vessels has become extremely limited. Chinese shipyards possess an enormous industrial ecosystem capable of simultaneously building container ships, oil tankers, LNG carriers, bulk carriers, and modern warships. The fact that approximately three-quarters of global new ship orders in 2024 went to Chinese shipyards demonstrates the extraordinary scale of this industrial dominance. The United States, meanwhile, faces delays in warship construction programs, rising costs, shortages of skilled labor, and serious bottlenecks in maintenance and repair capacity. Washington’s efforts to strengthen cooperation with South Korea and Japan in shipbuilding and naval maintenance are themselves a reflection of this structural weakness. Although not all of China’s commercial shipbuilding capacity can be directly converted into warship production, it nevertheless provides a formidable industrial foundation for military shipbuilding. Shipyards constructing commercial vessels in peacetime simultaneously develop enormous capabilities in steel processing, large-block assembly, propulsion systems, auxiliary machinery, electronic equipment, and digital systems integration.
In the United States, even increased naval shipbuilding budgets cannot quickly restore the skilled shipyard workforce, supplier networks, and industrial production culture lost since the 1990s. The fundamental reality that must never be forgotten is that wars are sustained not merely by the combat forces available at the outbreak of hostilities, but by the industrial production and logistics capabilities that support them. In a prolonged, high-intensity naval war, the ability to replace lost ships, repair damaged vessels, replenish ammunition stocks, and maintain maritime transportation will ultimately become decisive. China’s enormous merchant fleet, shipbuilding industry, and port infrastructure provide it with significant potential advantages in this regard. The United States, despite its worldwide network of military bases and extensive operational experience, faces a serious strategic vulnerability arising from the decline of its merchant marine and shipbuilding infrastructure.
In a prolonged conflict between major powers, these structural weaknesses could prove far more consequential than the number of warships available on the first day of war.
One of the greatest challenges of 19th-century naval strategy was the operational range of warships and their need for continuous logistical support. During the age of sail, wind provided a degree of freedom of movement that was fundamentally transformed by the widespread introduction of steam propulsion. Warships became dependent on coal supplies, creating an entirely new logistical order. For a warship to maintain a sustained presence across the oceans, it had to replenish its coal stocks at regular intervals. Coaling stations consequently evolved from mere technical supply points into indispensable instruments of imperial maritime strategy. Britain’s overseas possessions and facilities in Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Colombo, Singapore, Hong Kong, the Falkland Islands, and elsewhere formed an interconnected chain supporting the Royal Navy’s freedom of movement across the world’s oceans. Maintaining permanent access to critical maritime chokepoints and major ocean routes became one of the central missions of British geopolitics. Without such a network, protecting maritime trade and sustaining the connections of a global empire would have been impossible.
During the 20th century, coal gave way to oil and, subsequently, to increasingly sophisticated fuel supply and logistics systems. Yet the strategic logic of overseas basing did not disappear. On the contrary, following the Second World War, the United States adopted and expanded this model on a far greater scale. Pearl Harbor, Guam, Yokosuka, Sasebo, Diego Garcia, Bahrain, Rota, and Naples became essential components of the global network sustaining American naval power. Throughout the Cold War, Washington pursued its strategy of containing the Soviet Union not only through continental alliances but also through overseas naval bases, maritime transportation routes, and forward-deployed naval forces. This system gave the US Navy the ability to intervene rapidly in distant regions and sustain prolonged naval operations through forward logistical support. However, this superiority rested on a critical strategic assumption: that forward bases could largely be protected and that adversaries possessed only limited capabilities to target them continuously.
This model remained relatively sustainable after the Cold War, particularly against regional adversaries with limited military capabilities. Yet the proliferation of long-range precision-guided missiles, unmanned systems, and advanced intelligence and reconnaissance technologies gradually called its underlying assumptions into question. The 2026 Iran War brought these vulnerabilities into sharp focus.
One of the most significant consequences of the 2026 Iran War from the perspective of maritime geopolitics was the exposure of the growing vulnerability of American military bases and forward-deployed facilities around the Persian Gulf. Following the US-Israeli attacks launched on February 28, 2026, Iranian retaliatory strikes targeted the American military presence in the region as well as critical infrastructure in allied countries. Iran’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks threatened not only air defense systems but also radar installations, aircraft hangars, command facilities, and logistical infrastructure. Media reports indicated that Iranian or Iran-linked attacks damaged or destroyed structures at 26 American military bases and facilities across the Middle East. This development demonstrated that fixed military bases are no longer merely centers for projecting power. They are also stationary targets whose coordinates are known in advance.
We are witnessing a historic turning point. In the nineteenth century, the strategic value of a coaling station lay in its ability to replenish warships and sustain their operations. In the twentieth century, the value of American overseas bases stemmed from their ability to support global military operations. In the 21st century, however, these same bases face dramatically higher defensive costs against long-range precision-guided weapons, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned systems. Protecting a major military base now requires expensive air defense interceptors, sophisticated radar networks, electronic warfare systems, hardened infrastructure, and continuous operational readiness. The attacking side, meanwhile, may attempt to saturate defenses with relatively inexpensive unmanned systems or employ more costly precision missiles against critical infrastructure. The economic and military balance underlying the entire overseas basing system is therefore changing. This does not mean that military bases will disappear altogether. Naval forces will continue to require maintenance, repair, ammunition replenishment, and logistical support facilities in peacetime and during crises. However, the era in which large, fixed, and heavily concentrated forward bases could be regarded as unquestionably secure is coming to an end.
[Image: Iranian sailors preparing to set naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz, July 2026 (CC BY-SA 3.0)]
In the emerging strategic environment, distributed logistics, mobile naval support platforms, access to multiple ports, prepositioned supplies, and force structures capable of rapid relocation will become increasingly important. The fundamental lesson of the Iran War is clear: the mere existence of a military base no longer guarantees military control over the surrounding region. Moreover, an attack against a foreign military base can turn the host nation into a target in a war it neither initiated nor wished to enter. Consequently, the costs of forward basing are increasing not only militarily but also politically and diplomatically. The difficulties encountered by the United States against Iran also offer an indication of how much more complex the military equation could become in the Pacific against China, a power possessing vastly greater missile, satellite, naval, and air capabilities. It is precisely at this point that the contrast between the rising costs and vulnerabilities of America’s fixed overseas military bases and China’s economic expansion through global port and logistics networks becomes increasingly significant.
These two models are not exact equivalents. Nevertheless, they reveal a changing balance between military presence and economic access in the global struggle for power.
One of the defining characteristics of China’s maritime rise is that Beijing has not simply replicated the historical overseas basing models of Britain and the United States. Rather than pursuing expansion primarily through the establishment of large military bases around the world or the occupation of extensive territories, China has prioritized port investments, maritime trade, industrial production, and logistical connectivity. At the center of this approach lies a strategic objective: establishing an economic presence at the critical nodes of global trade and gaining influence over the transportation networks connecting industrial production centers with international markets. Chinese capital now maintains varying degrees of ownership or operational involvement in 145 ports across 50 countries. By integrating port investments with its merchant fleet, shipbuilding industry, railways, and overland transportation corridors, China is becoming an increasingly influential actor in the infrastructure of global maritime trade.
One of the most important examples of this strategy in Europe is Greece’s Port of Piraeus. Developed through COSCO’s investments, Piraeus has become a major logistical gateway linking the Mediterranean with the Balkans and Central Europe. Without establishing a military base, China has secured substantial economic and logistical influence at one of Europe’s principal commercial entry points. In the Indian Ocean, Pakistan’s Gwadar and Sri Lanka’s Hambantota ports stand out as strategically significant investments. Gwadar, envisioned as the maritime gateway of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, is intended to connect western China with the Arabian Sea and reduce Beijing’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca. Another major Chinese investment, this time on the Pacific coast of South America, is Peru’s Chancay Megaport, which began operations in November 2024. Developed under COSCO’s leadership, Chancay represents a new logistical gateway linking South America’s industrial, energy, and mineral-producing regions directly with Asian markets. Further south, the master plan for Peru’s Corío Megaport project was approved in September 2026, opening the project to international investors.
[Image: Piraeus station after the 2003-2004 restoration (CC BY-SA 3.0)]
Piraeus, Gwadar, Hambantota, and Chancay, despite their different geographical locations and economic functions, form important components of China’s expanding global trade and logistics network. Through these investments, Beijing is doing far more than generating revenue from port operations. It is establishing long-term economic and logistical influence over the connections between production centers, consumer markets, and maritime transportation routes. China’s military base in Djibouti demonstrates that Beijing has not abandoned overseas military basing as an instrument of national power. Nevertheless, the principal foundation of its global expansion remains economic and logistical connectivity rather than a worldwide network of military bases. This is one of the fundamental distinctions between the traditional Anglo-American model of maritime supremacy and the emerging Chinese approach to global sea power.
Throughout history, straits and narrow waterways have been among the most strategically significant geographical features in the struggle for command of the seas. Today, however, competition over these critical maritime chokepoints is no longer confined to military control or the ability to deny passage. The capacity to influence the continuity of maritime trade, exert pressure on energy and transportation flows, and develop alternative logistical corridors has also become a decisive element of strategic power. The Strait of Hormuz provides one of the most striking examples of the interdependence between military power, energy security, and global commerce. The 2026 Iran War against the United States and Israel demonstrated the extent to which Iran’s strategic geographical position around the Strait of Hormuz, combined with its missile and unmanned warfare capabilities and its ability to threaten maritime traffic, could disrupt global energy trade.
Similarly, Houthi attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, employing missiles, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned surface vessels, demonstrated that even the presence of the world’s most powerful navies cannot guarantee the security of maritime transportation. In both cases, the threat extended far beyond warships. It directly affected oil tankers, merchant fleets, insurance premiums, freight rates, and global supply chains. At the critical nodes of maritime transportation, geographical advantages, asymmetric weapons, and the ability to threaten freedom of passage can impose significant limitations on conventional naval superiority. In other words, asymmetric capabilities can, under certain operational conditions, outweigh the strategic advantages of a major naval power. Possessing a powerful navy is no longer, by itself, a guarantee of uninterrupted and secure maritime transportation. The Turkish naval victory in the Dardanelles on March 18, 1915, offers a historic example of this strategic reality: Ottoman coastal artillery and defensive minefields inflicted severe losses on the attacking Allied fleet, demonstrating how geography and layered defensive capabilities could frustrate a materially superior naval force attempting to force a narrow strait.
The Strait of Malacca represents a similar paradox for China: it is both an economic necessity and a strategic vulnerability. A substantial portion of China’s energy imports and foreign trade depends on maritime connections between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Beijing’s port investments in the Indian Ocean, the overland connections it has developed through Pakistan and Central Asia, and the broader Belt and Road Initiative are all components of a strategy designed to reduce this dependence. China’s approach seeks to increase its influence over the trading networks that depend on these chokepoints while ensuring that, when necessary, economic flows can be sustained through alternative routes. Consequently, in twenty-first-century maritime strategy, the decisive question is no longer simply whether a state can close a strategic strait. Equally important is whether trade and energy supplies can continue through alternative routes when that strait becomes inaccessible.
[Image source]
This development adds two essential dimensions to the traditional military concept of command of the seas: economic resilience and logistical flexibility.
One of the fundamental paradoxes of contemporary geopolitics is that the United States, whose global power has historically rested on command of the oceans, is increasingly focused on protecting fixed military bases, alliance structures, and containment lines, while China, a continental power, is expanding into the oceans through industrial production, trade, ports, and transportation corridors. The American military architecture extending along the First and Second Island Chains in the Pacific is becoming increasingly vulnerable to China’s long-range missiles, submarines, and expanding intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. The vulnerabilities of fixed military bases exposed during the 2026 Iran War serve as an important warning of the challenges Washington could face in the Pacific against a far more powerful adversary. China, however, is not without territorial ambitions of its own. Its military installations in the South China Sea, sovereignty claim over Taiwan, and disputes over maritime jurisdiction demonstrate that territorial and military considerations remain integral to its strategic calculations.
Nevertheless, the principal foundation of China’s global rise lies less in territorial occupation than in industrial production, commerce, and the maritime economy. Europe’s expansion into the Atlantic in the sixteenth century gradually shifted the center of gravity of global maritime trade and economic power from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. First Spain and Portugal, followed by the Netherlands and Britain, established global supremacy by combining maritime commerce, colonial networks, financial institutions, and naval power. The 19th century became the age of Pax Britannica. Following the Second World War, Britain was replaced by the United States. Pax Americana rested not merely on the supremacy of the US Navy across the world’s oceans, but also on the dollar-centered international financial system, global trading institutions, an extensive network of forward military bases, and control over the principal sea lines of communication.
Sea power thus evolved into something far greater than an instrument of military superiority. It became one of the fundamental mechanisms through which the global economy itself was organized and controlled. Today, this 500-year historical process is approaching another major turning point. As the center of gravity of global industrial production shifts toward Asia, China has emerged as one of the world’s leading powers in manufacturing, shipbuilding, port operations, and maritime trade. The United States still retains much of its military superiority at sea through its nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, global basing network, intelligence capabilities, and alliances. China, however, is challenging the United States precisely in the economic and industrial foundations of sea power. At the same time, China’s dependence on global trade and overseas energy supplies demonstrates that its rise also creates strategic vulnerabilities of its own.
The fundamental challenge confronting five centuries of Western maritime supremacy is therefore the changing balance between military power and the economic and industrial foundations of sea power. Command of the seas can no longer be understood merely as the deployment of warships across the oceans, the demonstration of naval presence, or the control of strategic chokepoints. Connecting industrial production centers with ports, developing merchant fleets and shipyards, and ensuring the continuity of energy and transportation corridors have become equally indispensable components of maritime power. China’s rise demonstrates that the five-hundred-year Atlantic-centered world order is evolving toward a new era increasingly shaped by the Asia-Pacific. This transformation does not necessarily point toward the absolute maritime supremacy of a single state. Rather, it suggests the emergence of a multipolar maritime order in which major powers compete strategically while remaining economically interdependent.
Within this historical transformation, Türkiye must not regard the changing global balance of sea power merely as a rivalry between the United States and China. For Türkiye, which controls the Turkish Straits and occupies a strategically advantageous peninsula between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, maritime power must be understood as something far greater than naval strength alone. It encompasses the merchant marine, shipyards, ports, maritime technologies, scientific research, and the entire maritime economy. This is precisely the fundamental philosophy of the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan). Protecting sovereign rights and maritime entitlements at sea is essential. Yet establishing a sustained economic, scientific, and technological presence within these maritime spaces is equally indispensable. The fundamental lesson to be drawn from China’s rise is that becoming a maritime nation requires a comprehensive, long-term state policy. Türkiye must not confront the transformation of the Atlantic-centered order and the rise of Asia with maritime blindness. It must develop an independent maritime strategy grounded in its own national interests.
For in the power struggles of the twenty-first century, it will not be navies alone that determine the outcome. Industrial production centers, ports, shipyards, merchant fleets, and maritime transportation networks will be equally decisive. Ottoman naval history has taught us this lesson with ruthless clarity: nations that turn toward the seas, produce, transport, and control maritime trading networks rise in power, while those that turn their backs on the seas risk losing not only their economic and strategic independence, but ultimately even their homeland. This is the historical reality that lies at the very heart of China’s challenge to five hundred years of Western maritime supremacy.

The coming Trump-Xi-Putin summit in Shenzhen reveals a shifting global balance of power and the emergence of a multipolar world. As Washington faces strategic overstretch, China and Russia are reshaping the diplomatic landscape.
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China has confirmed that President Xi Jinping will host US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin for a trilateral summit, which is being described as “historic”, in Shenzhen on November 19 – on the sidelines of the APEC leaders’ meeting.
According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the three leaders will hold in-depth exchanges on safeguarding world peace and promoting strategic stability among major powers. The significance of Shenzhen is not necessarily what the three leaders will agree upon, but what the very existence of this meeting tells us about the changing structure of international power.
During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were the two main poles of power. After 1991, Washington apparently became the undisputed center of the international system. Now, the American President is traveling to China for a meeting hosted by Xi Jinping, alongside the Russian leader.
This illustrates a redistribution of diplomatic centrality: America remains enormously powerful, yet can no longer dictate the diplomatic agenda unilaterally. Possessing the greatest concentration of power and the ability to organize the international system around one’s own preferences are two different things, after all.
As I argued earlier (when commenting on Iran), the question is not whether America is about to “collapse”, but whether it can adapt to an emerging multipolar environment. The paradox of American power is that the United States remains sufficiently powerful to intervene almost everywhere – but increasingly struggles to translate its enormous military, financial and technological capabilities into sustainable geopolitical outcomes.
Washington faces several overlapping challenges: the Iran war’s consequences for regional stability, energy markets and maritime security; the conflict in Eastern Europe; strategic competition with China; and the diversification of international financial and trade relationships.
Pursuing all these goals simultaneously, while absorbing their considerable economic and strategic costs, is a classic manifestation of imperial overstretch. Repeated conflicts, sanctions and tariff pressures have also strained alliances and encouraged alternative economic arrangements – as illustrated by de-dollarization trends within BRICS and the growing autonomy sought by countries across an increasingly non-aligned Global South.
Russia and China are not identical actors, but their interests increasingly converge around autonomy from Western financial structures, resistance to unilateral sanctions and opposition to a US-dominated international order.
Multipolarity, in any case, does not require a unified anti-American bloc.
Image source

China possesses enormous economic, industrial and technological weight – while Russia retains considerable military, nuclear, energy and geopolitical leverage. The United States in turn has formidable military, financial, technological and alliance capabilities. These different forms of power make the emerging system more complex.
The coming Shenzhen summit meeting demonstrates, above all, that Washington must increasingly negotiate with other centers of power that possess their own strategic agendas and diplomatic alternatives.
Xi Jinping is not simply another participant here: as host, China has the opportunity to present itself as a central interlocutor. Chinese analysts have stressed that the meeting is about strengthening strategic communication rather than carving up spheres of influence – and that it aligns with the trend toward multipolarity.
Comparisons with Yalta are inevitable yet limited. In 1945 the three principal Allied powers met near the end of a world war, with armies occupying vast territories. Today, the three countries are neither a unified victorious coalition nor the only relevant centers of power. India, Brazil, Iran, Turkey and others have their own agendas and cannot be framed as passive objects of any agreement.
In other words, the emerging polycentric order cannot simply be negotiated into existence by three great powers, however consequential their combined influence may be.
A more accurate reading is that Shenzhen potentially represents a world in which the world’s three largest nuclear powers recognize the necessity of direct communication – without necessarily agreeing on just how the international system should be organized.
Regarding the Ukraine question, Xi reportedly resisted treating it as a straightforward trilateral agenda item, arguing that Europeans should be involved in discussions about a European conflict. There is an irony here. Europe has substantial economic resources yet remains heavily dependent on American military capabilities.
Multipolarity is not necessarily emerging through an alliance against the United States, but through an increasing number of countries no longer considering alignment with Washington indispensable to their economic development, security or international legitimacy.
The United States is not collapsing – nor is it ceasing to be a first-tier power. What is changing is its ability to translate overwhelming material capabilities into political outcomes and to organize the international system around its own preferences.
In that sense, Shenzhen, in all likelihood, will be remembered not as a new Yalta – but as another indication that the post-Cold War moment of uncontested American primacy is giving way to something considerably more complex: a world in which even Washington must negotiate the terms of international order with others.
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This article was originally published on InfoBrics.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).