Oil Price History and Analysis
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A
discussion of crude oil prices, the relationship
between prices and rig count and the outlook for the future of
the petroleum industry. |
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Introduction
Like prices of other commodities the price of crude oil
experiences wide price swings in times of shortage or
oversupply. The crude oil price cycle may extend over
several years responding to changes in demand as well as
OPEC and non-OPEC supply. We will discuss the impact of
geopolitical events, supply demand and stocks as well as
NYMEX trading and the economy.
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the price of
U.S. petroleum was heavily regulated through production or
price controls. In the post World War II era, U.S. oil
prices at the wellhead averaged $28.52 per barrel adjusted
for inflation to 2010 dollars. In the absence of price
controls, the U.S. price would have tracked the world price
averaging near $30.54. Over the same post war period,
the median for the domestic and the adjusted world price of
crude oil was $20.53 in 2010 prices. Adjusted for
inflation, from 1947 to 2010 oil prices only exceeded $20.53
per barrel 50 percent of the time. (See note in the
box on right.)
Until March 28, 2000 when OPEC adopted the $22-$28 price
band for the OPEC basket of crude, real oil prices only
exceeded $30.00 per barrel in response to war or conflict in
the Middle East. With limited spare production
capacity, OPEC abandoned its price band in 2005 and was
powerless to stem a surge in oil prices, which was
reminiscent of the late 1970s.
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Crude
Oil Prices 1947 - October 2011
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graph for larger view
*World
Price
- The only very long term price series that
exists is the U.S. average wellhead or first
purchase price of crude. When discussing
long-term price behavior this presents a
problem since the U.S. imposed price
controls on domestic production from late 1973
to January 1981. In order to present a
consistent series and also reflect the
difference between international prices and
U.S. prices we created a world oil price
series that was consistent with the U.S.
wellhead price adjusting the wellhead price by
adding the difference between the refiners
acquisition price of imported crude and the
refiners average acquisition price of domestic
crude. |
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The Long Term View
The very long-term view is similar. Since 1869, US
crude oil prices adjusted for inflation averaged $23.67 per
barrel in 2010 dollars compared to $24.58 for world oil
prices.
Fifty percent of the time prices U.S. and world prices were
below the median oil price of $24.58 per barrel.
If long-term history is a guide, those in the upstream
segment of the crude oil industry should structure their
business to be able to operate with a profit, below $24.58
per barrel half of the time. The very long-term data
and the post World War II data suggest a "normal" price far
below the current price. However, the rise of OPEC,
which replaced the Texas Railroad Commission as the monitor
of spare production capacity, together with increased
interest in oil futures as an asset class introduced changes
that support prices far higher than the historical "norm.”
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Crude
Oil Prices 1869 - October 2011
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graph for larger view
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The results are dramatically different if only post-1970
data are used. In that case, U.S. crude oil had an average
price of $34.77 per barrel. The more relevant world
oil price averaged $37.93 per barrel. The median oil
price for that period is $32.50 per barrel.
If oil prices revert to the mean this period is a little
more appropriate for today's analyst. It follows the
peak in U.S. oil production eliminating the effects of the
Texas Railroad Commission which effectively controlled oil
prices prior to 1970. It is a period when the Seven
Sisters were no longer able to dominate oil production and
prices and an era of greater influence for OPEC oil
producers. As we will see in the detail below, influence
over the price of oil is not equivalent to control.
Prices in the mid $30s seem exceptionally low by today's
standards. However, when the current President of the United
States took office the price was $35.00 per barrel. By the
end of 2009 prices had doubled bringing the average for 2009
to $56.35 or $57.00 in 2010$.
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Crude Oil Prices 1970 - October 2011
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Post
World War II
Pre-Embargo Period
From 1948 through the end of the 1960s, crude oil prices
ranged between $2.50 and $3.00. The price oil rose from
$2.50 in 1948 to about $3.00 in 1957. When viewed in
2010 dollars, a different story emerges with crude oil
prices fluctuating between $17 and $19 during most of the
period. The apparent 20% price increase in nominal
prices just kept up with inflation.
From 1958 to 1970, prices were stable near $3.00 per barrel,
but in real terms the price of crude oil declined from $19
to $14 per barrel. Not only was price of crude lower
when adjusted for inflation, but in 1971 and 1972 the
international producer suffered the additional effect of a
weaker US dollar.
OPEC was established in 1960 with five founding members:
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Two of
the representatives at the initial meetings previously
studied the Texas Railroad Commission's method of
controlling price through limitations on production.
By the end of 1971, six other nations had joined the group:
Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Algeria and
Nigeria. From the foundation of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries through 1972, member countries
experienced steady decline in the purchasing power of a
barrel of oil.
Throughout the post war period exporting countries found
increased demand for their crude oil but a 30% decline in
the purchasing power of a barrel of oil. In March
1971, the balance of power shifted. That month the
Texas Railroad Commission set proration at 100 percent for
the first time. This meant that Texas producers were
no longer limited in the volume of oil that they could
produce from their wells. More important, it meant
that the power to control crude oil prices shifted from the
United States (Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana) to OPEC.
By 1971, there was no spare production capacity in the U.S.
and therefore no tool to put an upper limit on prices.
A little more than two years later, OPEC through the
unintended consequence of war obtained a glimpse of its
power to influence prices. It took over a decade from its
formation for OPEC to realize the extent of its ability to
influence the world market.
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World Events and Crude Oil Prices
1947-1973
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Middle East, OPEC and Oil Prices
1947-1973
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Middle East Supply Interruptions
Yom Kippur War - Arab Oil Embargo*
In 1972, the price of crude oil was below $3.50 per
barrel. The Yom Kippur War started with an attack on
Israel by Syria and Egypt on October 5, 1973. The
United States and many countries in the western world showed
support for Israel. In reaction to the support of
Israel, several Arab exporting nations joined by Iran
imposed an embargo on the countries supporting Israel.
While these nations curtailed production by five million
barrels per day, other countries were able to increase
production by a million barrels. The net loss of four
million barrels per day extended through March of
1974. It represented 7 percent of the free world
production. By the end of 1974, the nominal price of
oil had quadrupled to more than $12.00.
Any doubt that the ability to influence and in some cases
control crude oil prices had passed from the United States
to OPEC was removed as a consequence of the Oil
Embargo. The extreme sensitivity of prices to supply
shortages, became all too apparent when prices increased 400
percent in six short months.
From 1974 to 1978, the world crude oil price was relatively
flat ranging from $12.52 per barrel to $14.57 per
barrel. When adjusted for inflation world oil prices
were in a period of moderate decline. during that period
OPEC capacity and production was relatively flat near 30
million barrels per day.
In contrast, non-OPEC production increased from 25 million
barrels per day to 31 million barrels per day.
* While commonly called the Arab Oil Embargo or the
OPEC Oil Embargo, neither is technically correct. Arab
nations were joined by Persian Iran and founding OPEC
member Venezuela did not join in the embargo.
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U.S. and World
Events and Oil Prices 1973-1981
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OPEC Oil Production 1973 - June 2011
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Non-OPEC Oil Production 1973 - June 2011
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Crises in
Iran and Iraq
In 1979 and 1980, events in Iran and Iraq led to another
round of crude oil price increases. The Iranian revolution
resulted in the loss of 2.0-2.5 million barrels per day of
oil production between November 1978 and June 1979. At
one point production almost halted.
The Iranian revolution was the proximate cause of the
highest price in post-WWII history. However,
revolution's impact on prices would have been limited and of
relatively short duration had it not been for subsequent
events. In fact, shortly after the revolution, Iranian
production was up to four million barrels per day.
In September 1980, Iran already weakened by the revolution
was invaded by Iraq. By November, the combined
production of both countries was only a million barrels per
day. It was down 6.5 million barrels per day from a year
before. As a consequence, worldwide crude oil
production was 10 percent lower than in 1979.
The loss of production from the combined effects of the
Iranian revolution and the Iraq-Iran War caused crude oil
prices to more than double. The nominal price went
from $14 in 1978 to $35 per barrel in 1981.
Over three decades later Iran's production is only
two-thirds of the level reached under the government of Reza
Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran.
Iraq's production is now increasing, but remains a million
barrels below its peak before the Iraq-Iran War.
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Iran Oil production 1973 - June 2011
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Iraq Oil
production 1973 - June 2011
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US
Oil Price Controls - Bad Policy?
The rapid increase in crude prices from 1973 to 1981 would
have been less was it not for United States energy policy
during the post Embargo period. The U.S. imposed price
controls on domestically produced oil. The obvious
result of the price controls was that U.S. consumers of
crude oil paid about 50 percent more for imports than
domestic production and U.S. producers received less than
world market price. In effect, the domestic petroleum
industry was subsidizing the U.S. consumer.
Did the policy achieve its goal? In the short-term, the
recession induced by the 1973-1974 crude oil price spike was
somewhat less severe because U.S. consumers faced lower
prices than the rest of the world. However, it had
other effects as well.
In the absence of price controls, U.S. exploration and
production would certainly have been significantly greater.
Higher petroleum prices faced by consumers would have
resulted in lower rates of consumption: automobiles would
have achieved higher miles per gallon sooner, homes and
commercial buildings would have been better insulated and
improvements in industrial energy efficiency would have been
greater than they were during this period. Fuel substitution
away from petroleum to natural gas for electric power
generation would have occurred earlier.
Consequently, the United States would have been less
dependent on imports in 1979-1980 and the price increase in
response to Iranian and Iraqi supply interruptions would
have been significantly less.
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US Oil Price
Controls 1973-1981
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graph for larger view |
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OPEC
Fails to Control Crude Oil Prices |
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OPEC has seldom been effective at controlling prices. Often
described as a cartel, OPEC does not fully satisfy the
definition. One of the primary requirements of a
cartel is a mechanism to enforce member quotas. An elderly
Texas oil man posed a rhetorical question: What is the
difference between OPEC and the Texas Railroad Commission?
His answer: OPEC doesn't have any Texas Rangers!
The Texas Railroad Commission could control prices because
the state could enforce cutbacks on producers. The only
enforcement mechanism that ever existed in OPEC is Saudi
spare capacity and that power resides with a single member
not the organization as a whole.
With enough spare capacity to be able to increase
production sufficiently to offset the impact of lower prices
on its own revenue, Saudi Arabia could enforce discipline by
threatening to increase production enough to crash prices.
In reality even this was not an OPEC enforcement mechanism
unless OPEC's goals coincided with those of Saudi Arabia.
During the 1979-1980 period of rapidly increasing prices,
Saudi Arabia's oil minister Ahmed Yamani repeatedly warned
other members of OPEC that high prices would lead to a
reduction in demand. His warnings fell on deaf ears. Surging
prices caused several reactions among consumers: better
insulation in new homes, increased insulation in many older
homes, more energy efficiency in industrial processes, and
automobiles with higher efficiency. These factors along with
a global recession caused a reduction in demand which led to
lower crude prices.
Unfortunately for OPEC only the global recession was
temporary. Nobody rushed to remove insulation from their
homes or to replace energy efficient equipment and factories
-- much of the reaction to the oil price increase of the end
of the decade was permanent and would never respond to lower
prices with increased consumption of oil.
Higher prices in the late 1970s also resulted in increased
exploration and production outside of OPEC. From 1980 to
1986 non-OPEC production increased 6 million barrels per
day. Despite lower oil prices during that period new
discoveries made in the 1970s continued to come online.
OPEC was faced with lower demand and higher supply from
outside the organization. From 1982 to 1985, OPEC attempted
to set production quotas low enough to stabilize prices.
These attempts resulted in repeated failure, as various
members of OPEC produced beyond their quotas. During most of
this period Saudi Arabia acted as the swing producer cutting
its production in an attempt to stem the free fall in
prices. In August 1985, the Saudis tired of this role.
They linked their oil price to the spot market for crude and
by early 1986 increased production from two million barrels
per day to five million. Crude oil prices plummeted
falling below $10 per barrel by mid-1986. Despite the fall
in prices Saudi revenue remained about the same with higher
volumes compensating for lower prices.
A December 1986 OPEC price accord set to target $18 per
barrel, but it was already breaking down by January of 1987
and prices remained weak.
The price of crude oil spiked in 1990 with the lower
production, uncertainty associated with the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War. The world and
particularly the Middle East had a much harsher view of
Saddam Hussein invading Arab Kuwait than they did Persian
Iran. The proximity to the world's largest oil producer
helped to shape the reaction.
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World
Events
and Crude Oil Prices 1981-1998
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U.S.
Petroleum Consumption
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Non-OPEC Production & Crude Oil Prices
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OPEC Production & Crude Oil Prices
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Following what became known as
the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait, crude oil prices entered a
period of steady decline. In 1994, the inflation adjusted
oil price reached the lowest level since 1973.
The price cycle then turned up. The United States economy
was strong and the Asian Pacific region was booming. From
1990 to 1997, world oil consumption increased 6.2 million
barrels per day. Asian consumption accounted for all but
300,000 barrels per day of that gain and contributed to a
price recovery that extended into 1997. Declining Russian
production contributed to the price recovery. Between 1990
and 1996 Russian production declined more than five million
barrels per day.
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Russian
Crude Oil Production
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OPEC
continued to have mixed success in controlling prices. There
were mistakes in timing of quota changes as well as the
usual problems in maintaining production discipline among
member countries.
The price increases came to a rapid end in 1997 and 1998
when the impact of the economic crisis in Asia was either
ignored or underestimated by OPEC. In December 1997,
OPEC increased its quota by 2.5 million barrels per day (10
percent) to 27.5 million barrels per day effective January
1, 1998. The rapid growth in Asian economies came to a halt.
In 1998, Asian Pacific oil consumption declined for the
first time since 1982. The combination of lower consumption
and higher OPEC production sent prices into a downward
spiral. In response, OPEC cut quotas by 1.25
million barrels per day in April and another 1.335 million
in July. The price continued down through December 1998.
Prices began to recover in early 1999. In April, OPEC
reduced production by another 1.719 million barrels. As
usual not all of the quotas were observed, but between early
1998 and the middle of 1999 OPEC production dropped by about
three million barrels per day. The cuts were sufficient to
move prices above $25 per barrel.
With minimal Y2K problems and growing U.S. and world
economies, the price continued to rise throughout 2000 to a
post 1981 high. In 2000 between April and October, three
successive OPEC quota increases totaling 3.2 million barrels
per day were not able to stem the price increase. Prices
finally started down following another quota increase of
500,000 effective November 1, 2000.
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World
Events
and Crude Oil Prices 1997-2003
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OPEC
Production
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Russian production increases dominated non-OPEC
production growth from 2000 to 2007 and was responsible for
most of the non-OPEC increase since the turn of the century.
Once again it appeared that OPEC overshot the mark. In 2001,
a weakened US economy and increases in non-OPEC production
put downward pressure on prices. In response OPEC once
again entered into a series of reductions in member quotas
cutting 3.5 million barrels by September 1, 2001. In the
absence of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, this
would have been sufficient to moderate or even reverse the
downward trend.
In the wake of the attack, crude oil prices plummeted. Spot
prices for the U.S. benchmark West Texas Intermediate were
down 35 percent by the middle of November. Under normal
circumstances a drop in price of this magnitude would have
resulted in another round of quota reductions. Given the
political climate OPEC delayed additional cuts until January
2002. It then reduced its quota by 1.5 million barrels per
day and was joined by several non-OPEC producers including
Russia which promised combined production cuts of an
additional 462,500 barrels. This had the desired effect with
oil prices moving into the $25 range by March 2002. By
midyear the non-OPEC members were restoring their production
cuts but prices continued to rise as U.S. inventories
reached a 20-year low later in the year.
By year end oversupply was not a problem. Problems in
Venezuela led to a strike at PDVSA causing Venezuelan
production to plummet. In the wake of the strike Venezuela
was never able to restore capacity to its previous level and
is still about 900,000 barrels per day below its peak
capacity of 3.5 million barrels per day. OPEC increased
quotas by 2.8 million barrels per day in January and
February 2003.
On March 19, 2003, just as some Venezuelan production was
beginning to return, military action commenced in Iraq.
Meanwhile, inventories remained low in the U.S. and other
OECD countries. With an improving economy U.S. demand was
increasing and Asian demand for crude oil was growing at a
rapid pace.
The loss of production capacity in Iraq and Venezuela
combined with increased OPEC production to meet growing
international demand led to the erosion of excess oil
production capacity. In mid 2002, there were more than six
million barrels per day of excess production capacity and by
mid-2003 the excess was below two million. During much of
2004 and 2005 the spare capacity to produce oil was less
than a million barrels per day. A million barrels per day is
not enough spare capacity to cover an interruption of supply
from most OPEC producers.
In a world that consumes more than 80 million barrels per
day of petroleum products that added a significant risk
premium to crude oil price and was largely responsible for
prices in excess of $40-$50 per barrel.
Other major factors contributing to higher prices included a
weak dollar and the rapid growth in Asian economies and
their petroleum consumption. The 2005 hurricanes and
U.S. refinery problems associated with the conversion from
MTBE to ethanol as a gasoline additive also contributed to
higher prices.
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World
Events
and Crude Oil Prices 2001-2005
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Russian
Crude Oil Production
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Venezuelan
Oil Production
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Excess
Crude Oil Production Capacity
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One of
the most important factors determining price is the level of
petroleum inventories in the U.S. and other consuming
countries. Until spare capacity became an issue inventory
levels provided an excellent tool for short-term price
forecasts. Although not well publicized OPEC has for several
years depended on a policy that amounts to world inventory
management. Its primary reason for cutting back on
production in November 2006 and again in February 2007 was
concern about growing OECD inventories. Their focus is on
total petroleum inventories including crude oil and
petroleum products, which is a better indicator of prices
that oil inventories alone.
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World Events and Crude Oil Prices 2004-2007
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In 2008, after the beginning of the longest U.S. recession
since the Great Depression the oil price continued to soar.
Spare capacity dipped below a million barrels per day and
speculation in the crude oil futures market was
exceptionally strong. Trading on NYMEX closed at a record
$145.29 on July 3, 2008. In the face of recession and
falling petroleum demand the price fell throughout the
remainder of the year to the below $40 in December.
Following an OPEC cut of 4.2 million b/d in January 2009
prices rose steadily in the supported by rising demand in
Asia. In late February 2011, prices jumped as a consequence
of the loss of Libyan exports in the face of the Libyan
civil war. Concern about additional interruptions from
unrest in other Middle East and North African producers
continues to support the price while as of Mid-October
400,000 barrels per day of Libyan production was restored.
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World Events and Crude Oil Prices 2007 -
May 20, 2011Recessions and Oil Prices
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Futures
Market and Brent / NYMEX Divergence
While
speculation in the futures market was certainly a
component of price increases over the last decade,
research has yet to provide incontrovertible evidence that
it was a major driver of prices. Over the last decade the
number of futures contracts on NYMEX increased at over ten
times the rate of increase of world petroleum consumption.
In recent years, the ICE Brent contracts grew at a higher
rate than NYMEX.
A NYMEX futures contract is a contract to deliver 1,000
barrels of light sweet crude oil in a certain month to the
buyer at Cushing, Oklahoma. There is a direct link between
futures prices and the cash price at Cushing. We will
illustrate with an example. A producer of crude oil is
offered $80 per barrel for 1,000 barrel of oil today. The
same producer sees that the futures contract for delivery
next month is trading at $85 dollars. Instead of selling
at $80 to the refiner the producer could sell a futures
contract for delivery next month at $85, store the 1,000
barrels for a month and be $5 better off less the cost of
a months storage. The refiner needing the 1,000 barrels of
crude today is then in the position that he must offer the
producer something closer to the $85 NYMEX price to obtain
the crude.
Historically, the price of
NYMEX crude typically traded near the Brent price with a
small premium. Since late 2010, Brent and NYMEX prices
have diverged with West Texas Intermediate at Cushing,
Oklahoma selling often selling more than $20 below Brent
and other comparable crude oil. While continually quoted
in the U.S. media as the oil price, oil at Cushing is not
currently representative of world oil prices. The reason
for the discount is high stocks of oil at Cushing with
a limited number of refiners that can be served by
pipelines out of Cushing.
Additional oil from Canada and the Bakken formation in
North Dakota caused the local supply to exceed demand of
the refiners served by pipelines out of Cushing. This
resulted in oil stocks to building to 1.5 - 2.0 times the
normal level. High stocks at Cushing depressed the local
price, but not the price internationally. A return to the
normal price relationship with WTI at a modest premium to
Brent awaits improved pipeline access between Cushing and
the refineries on the gulf of Mexico.
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Recessions and Oil Prices
It is worth noting that the three
longest U.S. recessions since the Great Depression
coincided with exceptionally high oil prices. The first
two lasted 16 months. The first followed the 1973 Embargo
started in November 1973 and the second in July 1981. The
latest began in December 2007 and lasted 18 months. Charts
similar to the one at the right have been used to argue
that price spikes and high oil prices cause recessions.
There is little doubt that price is a major factor.
The same graph makes an even more compelling argument that
recessions cause low oil prices.
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